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Abstract: This paper critically analyses the case study of Chinese international relations 
theory through the lens of a non-Western International relations theoretical framework. 
There should be an attempt to democratise the existing international relations discipline 
because societal interactions among the countries across the globe cannot be judged by 
the yardstick of Western experiences. Non-Western international relations theories can 
be also generated under the post-positivist methodological framework, as it is equally 
important to include the localised voices and experiences of Asian, African and Latin 
American countries by reactivating their local historical traditions and ancient philoso-
phies, sociological perspective and ontological, epistemological and axiological dimension 
of international relations theories3. 
Key words: International Relations Theory - Tribute System – Confucian Model of Gov-
ernance – World Order 
Resumen: Este artículo analiza críticamente la teoría china de las relaciones internaciona-
les, como estudio de caso, desde la perspectiva del marco teórico de las relaciones inter-
nacionales no occidentales. Debe haber un intento de democratizar la disciplina existente 
de las relaciones internacionales ya que las interacciones sociales entre los países del 
globo no pueden ser juzgadas desde la perspectiva de las experiencias occidentales. Las 
teorías de las relaciones internacionales no occidentales también pueden ser generadas 
dentro del marco metodológico post-positivista ya que es igualmente importante incluir 
las voces y experiencias localizadas de los países asiáticos, africanos y latinoamericanos a 
partir de la reactivación de sus tradiciones históricas locales y sus filosofías antiguas, la 
perspectiva sociológica y la dimensión ontológica, epistemológica y axiológica de las 
teorías de las relaciones internacionales. 
Palabras Claves: Teoría de las Relaciones Internacionales - Sistema de tributo – modelo 
confuciano de gobernanza – orden mundial 
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1. Introduction  
The rise of China and its integration to the global community are two of the most 
important phenomena in the post Cold war era. Although there are several studies from 
the Western international relations theories, the basic problem lies on the existing West-
ern international relations theories (IRT), which were primarily based on the geo-political, 
geo-cultural, and historical experiences of European modern nation-states. Hence they 
are not sufficient to explain the international affairs of civilisation states like China, India 
and Iran, among others. It can also be claimed that the understanding of the rise of China 
depends on the kind of international relations theoretical framework employed. In fact, 
there are various debates on the western form of democracy and the developmental 
trajectory of China. This study, however, is an attempt to examine the nature and impli-
cations of theorising Chinese international relations and explaining the Chinese foreign 
policy decision making process.  
Initially, Chinese International Relations (IR) were controlled by the Chinese Com-
munist party, especially during the Maoist era (1949-76). Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong 
thought was the official guiding force in dealing with other countries. But only after the 
Fourteenth Party Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1992, did Deng 
Xiaoping’s ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’ become the guiding ideology, where 
special attention was given in order to establish IR as an academic discipline for theoreti-
cal and empirical research. As a result, the ‘National Association of History of Interna-
tional Relations’ (NAHIR) was set up in 1980, changing its name 1999 into ‘China National 
Association for International Studies’ (CNAIS) on account of its wide coverage and clear 
objectives. Over the years, China as a civilisation state started realising that there was a 
need to develop its own Chinese international relations theories (IRT). For Chinese IR 
scholars, Chinese IRT should be rooted in traditional Chinese philosophy and Western 
theoretical achievements, as we see in the case of Western IRT.4 Now we see the dia-
logues between different Chinese schools as well as a dialogue between Chinese schools 
and western IRT. This ultimately can give birth to the possibility of Chinese international 
relations theory under the non-Western international relations perspective, which will 
help to pluralise the epistemological bases of Western international relations theory by 
adding rich and diverse ontological assumptions. Here, one can argue that the local tradi-
tions of such civilization states are going to help in developing a more inclusive, demo-
cratic, and progressive methodology for theorising international relations.  
2. Phases in Chinese IR Theories 
Since we have already discussed the institutional building for the establishment of 
IR as an academic discipline in China, let us now have a closer look at the different phases 
involved in this process in this section. With reference to Professor Qin Yaqing, who ar-
gues that the development of IR as an academic discipline has taken place in three phas-
es in China, namely: the pre-theory phase (1978-90), the theory-learning phase (1991-
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2000) and the theory-innovation phase (2007 till today).5 In the pre-theory phase (1978-
90), both Marxism and Leninism were dominant, but no conscious attempt was made to 
build a theoretical paradigm. This was the period when Mao Zedong developed his ‘Three 
World Theory’6. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought were the guiding principle 
using dialectic materialism as a tool to gauge the contradictions in international affairs. 
How come Marxism as a theory is not considered to be pragmatic or realistic? Why can 
we not develop a theoretical paradigm under the existing Marxism-Leninism and Mao 
Zedong thoughts?  
Under the theory-learning phase (1991-2000), dominant western IRT like liberalism 
and realism became the guiding force among the Chinese IR communities for explaining 
Chinese foreign policy’s decision-making processes. After the fourteenth party congress 
of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1992, special attention was paid to establish IR 
under Deng Xiaoping’s Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for theoretical and empiri-
cal research. Attempts were made to develop Chinese international relations theories by 
employing traditional Chinese philosophy and Western theoretical achievements, be-
cause of the tension between dominant Western international relations theories and 
endeavours to develop Chinese IR theories. At the sixteenth party congress of the Com-
munist Party of China (CPC) in 2002, Jiang Zemin proposed ‘Three Represents’7. The focus 
of IR in China has somewhat shifted from classical mainstream IR theories to the English 
School of IR in particular.8 These were the times when CPC was trying to learn from the 
dominant western IRT, but Chinese IR scholars were really looking for alternative narra-
tives to explain Chinese foreign policy, especially after the 1989 Tiananmen Square inci-
dent. Actually, this phase compelled Chinese IR scholars to creatively work on existing 
dominant western IRT and Chinese philosophy together. 
After the theory-learning phase, the deepening stage (2001-07) developed an in-
terest in constructivism, which coincided with the debate on the ‘peaceful rise of China’ 
under the Chinese philosophy of yi jing or I Ching, which implies that identity and behav-
iour are changeable. Also, Chinese IR scholars realised that IR theories were not only a 
tool for interpretation of foreign policy but also a means to understand the complexities 
of international politics.9 There is no doubt about this being the phase when Chinese IR 
scholars learned western methodology and analytical frameworks, but they tried to de-
rive the ontological essence from the ancient Chinese philosophy in order to explain the 
integration of Chinese economy into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001.  
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In the theory innovation phase (2007 till today), the focus is more on ‘how to build 
Chinese IR theory’ than on ‘whether to develop Chinese IR theory’, where - how to - 
questions marked the beginning of theory innovation phase. At the Seventeenth Party 
Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 2007, Hu Jintao articulated the ‘scien-
tific outlook on development’ under which emphasis was placed on ‘harmonious world’ 
and ‘harmonious society’, which cannot be achieved without peaceful development. One 
can see clearly that Jiang Zemin’s emphasis was on building a ‘well off society’ by 2020 
through maintaining a high growth rate, but Hu Jintao’s stress was on balanced and sus-
tainable economic development. Moreover, the interest in Constructivism coincided with 
the official debate on a peaceful rise of China, which led to redefine both China’s national 
interests and Chinese strategy for peaceful development in the world.10 After the Eight-
eenth Party Congress of Chinese Communist Party (CPC) in 2012, President Xi Jinping 
talked about the ‘Chinese Dream’ and the ‘Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)’. Internally, he 
stressed more the building of a well-off society by eradicating poverty for around 50 
million people under the supply side reform of the Chinese economy by 2020. Externally, 
he talked about the positive roles of the BRI by connecting Europe with Asia and reviving 
the ancient silk routes. Now, there are talks about the possible inclusion of west-Asian or 
Middle Eastern, Latin American and African countries in China’s BRI too. The establish-
ment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICS New Development 
Bank, the hosting of G-20 summit in Hangzhou and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech 
in the World Economic Forum this year, where he highlighted the benefits of globaliza-
tion, as well as China’s leadership role in Paris Climate Deal 2016 for building an inclusive, 
equitable and just world economic order cannot be ignored. Hence, there is clearly a shift 
in Chinese foreign policy from Deng Xiaoping’s 24 characters strategy, which constitues 
‘keeping a low profile and bide for your time’, to Xi Jinping’s the global leadership role in 
geo-political and geo-economic affairs.  
3. Sinicization of the IR Theories Debate 
This section deals with the development trajectories of Chinese International rela-
tions, where prominent Chinese scholars like Yan Xuetong, Zhao Tingyang and Qin Yaqing 
are constantly pressing for the need of either a ‘Chinese school’ of International Relations 
or ‘IR theories with Chinese characteristics’. 
Yan Xuetong emphasized the need to first develop theories and then work towards 
the gradual development of a ‘Chinese school of IR’. He takes into account the traditional 
thoughts from the ‘spring & autumn period’ and ‘warring states period’ by stressing 
social scientific methodology and theoretical universalism. His emphasises lies on quanti-
tative methods with the acknowledgement that different questions need different meth-
ods of study, including hypothesis testing, causal analysis, objectivity, and verifiability. 
Therefore, he endorses Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realist concept that international politics is 
all about hard power and can be understood effectively through ‘level of analysis’ tools. 
As a result, he puts the analytical perspectives of ‘Mozi and Laozi’ on the level of system, 
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those of ‘Guanzi and Hanfeizi’ on the level of the state, and those of ‘Confucius, Mencius, 
and Xunzi’ on the level of the individual. His greater emphasis, however, is on political 
power as opposed to economic and military power, hierarchy as opposed to anarchy, and 
on international norms, state morality, political ideas, and the very idea of human au-
thority which led to ‘realism with Chinese characteristics’.11 He is undoubtedly using a 
scientific quantitative research methodology but, at the same time, he is also trying to 
use ancient Chinese thoughts to explain the foreign policy decision making process of 
China. But it would be interesting to see how far his usage of Kenneth Waltz’s level of 
analysis tool will critically analyse the rise of China. Does it really make the use of quanti-
tative methodology compatible with ancient Chinese thoughts and concepts? 
Zhao Tingyang argues that the existing world-order is a ‘non-world’ due to the ab-
sence of a transnational governance structure in existing Western inter-state institutions; 
hence, the various international organizations and regional organizations cannot solve 
the current issues and affairs of global nature. Under Confucianism, the term Tianxia 
(meaning “all under heaven”) has a triple meaning: as the land of the world, as all peo-
ples in the world, and as a world institution. And, the Tianxia system emphasizes the 
unity of the physical world (land), the psychological world (the general heart of the peo-
ples’), and the political world (a world institution). As a result, Confucian Tianxia Institu-
tions are world institutions in the real sense, and can therefore be used for establishing a 
global world and solving global problems in effective ways. The Chinese worldview is also 
different in the sense that it emphasises political characteristics of a worldview, which 
favours hierarchy. For him, social factors like ethics, hierarchy and identity, which are 
shared amongst all people in the world, are key to the tianxia system. He also sees the 
‘Chinese School’ as the assertion of cultural sovereignty to protect China’s unique way of 
understanding the world.12  
His advocacy for a Chinese school comes from the vantage point of culture, where 
he argues that globalisation is a danger in the process of conceptualising a new world 
order. He does talk about knowledge as the function of power, but can this school of 
international relations lead to the emergence of non-Western international relations 
theories? How is this creation of a Chinese school of International Relations as an aca-
demic discipline not a reactionary response against the so-called existing dominant west-
ern international relations theories? In fact, one can also argue that knowledge is inter-
dependent, pluralistic, cross-cultural and fluid in nature, but what he is trying to do is to 
create an epistemology based on the ancient Chinese world order, that is, the Tianxia 
worldview.  
Qin Yaqing talks about the combination of Western and Chinese ways of logical 
reasoning and theory development. Informed by both Chinese and Western thoughts, he 
has made an effort to conceptualise the core Chinese thought for constructing a theoret-
ical system, and to use Chinese practices to enrich established IR theories. While the core 
theoretical problematic of American IR theory is hegemonic maintenance; the core theo-
retical problematic of British IR theory is the formation and development of international 
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society under the European concept of rationalism. Here, he explores a ‘core theoretical 
problematic’ based on the ancient Chinese thought of relationalism to build both infor-
mal networking and relational governance, which is strongly influenced by Imre Lakatos’s 
hard core-protective belt argument about research programs in research methodology. 
Furthermore, he elaborates three basic characteristics for developing a distinct Chinese 
theory, as follows: a) It should be based on Chinese culture, historical traditions, and 
practical experience. b) It should be universally valid, transcending local traditions and 
experience. c) Its core assumptions must be distinct from those of other theories.13  
He focuses more on the development of a Chinese theory under the larger frame-
work of non-Western International Relations theory by using a scientific methodology. 
He stresses the importance of dialogues between Chinese International Relations schol-
ars and Western International Relations scholars; between existing dominant Western 
International Relations scholars and non-Western International Relations scholars, and 
finally among Chinese International Relations scholars. But it would be interesting to see 
how this process of Chinese International Relations theories can be accommodated un-
der the larger framework of non-Western International Relations theories as non-
Western International Relations discourse, which is still in its nascent stage. 
4. The East Asian World Order and the Relational Governance Model 
It is important to note how the rise of China is going to locate its ancient tributary 
system worldview in relation to East Asia countries and the other countries of the world, 
e.g. that the tribute system is not just a division of territories among sovereign modern 
nation-states. In ancient Chinese thought, history has always been the guiding force to 
conduct foreign affairs. Therefore, understanding ancient Chinese thoughts on intra-state 
relationships, i.e. Sino-centrism, is crucial in order to understand the Chinese foreign 
policy decision making process today. In fact, the East Asian world order was also based 
on the notions of Chinese centrality and superiority, which were hierarchical and non-
egalitarian, similar to Chinese society itself. Terms such as Tianxia (all under heaven), 
Tianzi (son of a heaven) and Zhongguo (middle kingdom) highlight this fact. Historically, 
East Asian Order was based on the tribute system language. But one can also analyse 
these inter-state relations without adhering to these terms in a literal sense, because the 
main reason behind this language system was western scholar John King Fairbank’s in-
terpretation of the Chinese worldview. The tribute system, however, dates back to the 
traditional Chinese historical source as chaogong tixi, and not even the Chinese people 
had any idea about its conception. In this scenario, one can argue that the East Asian 
world order needs to be understood in a much broader sense, and that any attempt to 
apply the Fairbankian notion of tribute system would be insufficient. So an important 
question arises here: to what extent was the relationship under the tributary system 
justifiable? It is undeniable that there is a need to develop creative methods for trans-
cending the existing tributary system paradigm in order to make conceptualisations un-
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der such ancient concepts as chaogong tixi. In fact, one can question the purpose of the 
tributary system, as there was no element of territorial conflict in it.14  
In order to conceptualise chaogong tixi, emphasis is given to looking at Chinese in-
tellectual traditions, which are deeply rooted in their ancient culture. The convergence 
and divergence of Chinese imagination and Western imagination of the world order in 
the past and future can be another way to look at it. But can we map the Chinese imagi-
nation of world order today? How do we need to apply today’s tributary system’s con-
crete material conditions? How can this ancient concept of tribute system be trans-
formed in order to understand Chinese foreign policy decision-making process today?15 
One possible way is through the idea that the ancient Chinese state was based on 
Confucius’s principle of datong (meaning “Universal Great Harmony”) with cultural harmo-
ny. That is why we see a big influence of these ancient Chinese thoughts on the theme of 
government policy from the second to the fifth leadership generation in the Chinese com-
munist party. In their government policy, they always strive for peace and broad develop-
ment. China as a nation-state no longer follows ancient concept like zhongguo (meaning 
“middle kingdom”) today, but one can also wonder to what extent the Chinese foreign 
policy decision-making process is guided by tribute system worldview. For many Chinese 
scholars, the tribute system is still a relevant concept because China is trying to constantly 
transform and conceptualise as a learning state in the realm of world politics.16  
Since the liberation of New China in 1949, one can witness the irrelevance of the 
tribute system as a sovereign modern nation-state. Another question can also be asked: 
under the Sino-Soviet rapprochement, was Mao in a position to establish China-centred 
foreign relations with other countries of the world? In 1971, China established diplomatic 
relationship with the US; then, China moved more closely to the Western world with the 
permanent membership to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). In fact, Chinese 
political culture was also gradually influenced by the norms and political culture of these 
international organizations and the existing world order after the collapse of Soviet Un-
ion in 1991. But even today the ancient concept of Datong (Universal Great Harmony) 
and Cultural harmony are guiding cultural forces to protect Chinese sovereignty and 
national integrity. This shows China’s cultural confidence to learn from western cultures 
without any insecurity. Despite Chinese attempts to avoid great power politics under the 
tribute system, one can question the relevance of Francis Fukuyama’s end of history and 
last man thesis. China, with its one party rule, is projecting an alternative model of politi-
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cal and economic development and the main reason behind this is the ancient Chinese 
cultural belief in the inevitability of change.17  
The main reason behind the Chinese cultural belief is change as a dialectical pro-
cess, which influences both China as a civilisation state and the Western modern nation-
state in the course of its rise and integration with the global community. The ancient 
Chinese concept of I Ching or yi jing has been the guiding force for this Chinese cultural 
belief in the ‘inevitability of Change’ for more than 5,000 years. Moreover, China’s inte-
gration into the existing world order (i.e. jiegui) can be interpreted in many ways: some 
Chinese scholars believe that Chinese integration has its own benefits and is good for the 
interests of the global community as a whole. But these Chinese scholars are also deter-
mined to use ancient Chinese concepts, such as the tribute system, as a tool to protect 
New China’s national interests. In fact, China has carefully chosen to join the global 
community in order to obtain benefits from it so as to safeguard the economic interests 
of their population.18  
5. Conclusion 
As Michel Foucault rightly points out, knowledge production is the function of 
power. One can argue that the existing dominant Western International Relations theo-
ries are colonial in nature and thus deny space for the localised traditions and historical 
experiences from the non-Western world. At present, International Relations scholarship 
is primarily dominated by North American (known as the ‘West’) with some European 
scholars, but as of now European countries have yet to receive their due share in the 
creation, formation and influence on existing western International Relations theories. 
There are many countries that make up the western world, but it is primarily North 
American International Relations theorists who are projected as the sole representatives 
of the entire European and North American International Relations Scholarship. This 
raises a concern about the whole task of theorising and establishing the methodological, 
ontological and epistemological bases of Western International Relations theories; but, at 
the same time, there is a need to allow for the realisation and formulation of non-
Western International Relations theories. There should be an attempt to democratise the 
existing International Relations as an academic discipline, where the global heritage of 
International Relations theories can also be derived from the post positivist non-Western 
International Relations perspectives based on the historical experiences of Asian, African 
and Latin American countries (known as the ‘non-West’). Hence, the societal interactions 
among these non-Western countries cannot be judged only with the yardstick of North 
American and European historical experiences. If the ‘West’ is successful in projecting 
their International Relations theories as universal and homogenous, then the ‘non-West’ 
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can also create and project their own International Relations theories in order to plural-
ise the epistemological bases of existing International Relations theories. It is equally 
important to give proper attention to the alternative histories and different trajectories 
of socio-political-economic development, as well to apply the traditional philosophies of 
Asian, African and Latin American countries with the aim of enriching the ontological, 
epistemological and axiological dimension of existing International Relations theories.  
In this context, there is a need to ask how this conceptualisation of Chinese inter-
national theories can be realised under a broader framework of non-Western Interna-
tional Relations perspectives. In fact, a non-Western International Relations perspective 
does not have any approach towards feminism or reflexivism. How are they going to 
apply a quantitative research methodology, like testable hypotheses and research pro-
gramme? One should not forget that the generation of any theory has its own context; 
hence, it is crucial to debate, dialogue and discover the context behind the generation of 
non-Western International Relations theories from a civilisation state’s perspective in 
general and Chinese International Relations theories under the phenomenon of the rise 
of China in particular. 
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